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For the last thirty years, policymakers have targeted teenaged childbearing
as the root cause of poverty, childhood deprivation, and intergenerational
disadvantage. In 1987, a blue ribbon panel of the National Research Council
concluded that:
[WIomen who become parents as teenagers are at greater risk of social and
economic disadvantage throughout their lives than those who delay
childbearing until their twenties. They are less likely to complete their
education, to be employed, to earn high wages, and to be happily married; and
they are more likely to have larger families and to receive welfare. I
Studies document the facts that teenaged mothers are more likely than other
mothers to drop out of school, 2 to remain single or suffer unstable marriages, 3
and to lack child support from the fathers of their children. 4 They are also
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work.
I NATIONAL RESERACH COUNCIL, 1 RISKING THE FuTURE 138 (Cheryl Hayes ed., 1987).
For a more recent expression of the perceived link between teenaged childbearing and systemic
poverty, see Jason DeParle, Clinton Taget: Teen-Age Pregnancy, N.Y. TImES, Mar. 22, 1994,
atB6.
Before the nineteen-sixties, teenaged childbearing was common but received little attention
as a possible source of poverty. See Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr. et al., Teenaged Pregnancy and
Childbearing, 44 AN PsYcHOLOGisT 313 (1989); Lorraine V. Klerman, The Association
Between Adolescent Parenting and Childhood Poverty, in CHaIDREN IN POVERTY 79, 79
(Aletha C. Huston ed., 1991). Policymakers in an earlier era may not have focused on births to
teenagers because those births both were more socially accepted and resulted more often in
marriage. Id. at 83.
2 See, e.g., Daniel H. Klepinger et al., Adolescent Fertility and the Educational
Attainment of Young Women, 27 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 23, 26 (1995) (simple correlations show
strong negative relationship between teenaged childbearing and educational attainment for all
races); Frank L. Mott & William Marsiglio, Eari, Childbearing and Completion of High
School, 17 FAt PLAN. PERSP. 234 (1985).
3 Klerman, supra note 1, at 90; FRANK F. FURmSENBERG, JR. ET AL., ADoLEENT
MOTHERS IN LAM LIFE 32-33 (1987); James McCarthy & Jane Menken, Marriage,
Remarriage, Marital Disruption andAge at First Birth, I I FAM PLAN. PERsP. 21 (1979).
4 Furstenberg et al., supra note 1, at 314-15; Klerman, supra note 1, at 88.
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disproportionately likely to be poor,5 to rely upon welfare, 6 and to raise
daughters who will repeat this pattern. 7 The children of teenaged mothers are
more likely than their peers to suffer ill health,8 low cognitive development, 9
child abuse, 1° and behavior problems." Surely these children do not enjoy an
equal opportunity to capture the American dream.
Our focus on teenaged childbearing as the wellspring of poverty yields
both tantalizing promise and deep disappointment. The promise rests on our
belief that, if we could only end teenaged childbearing, we would dramatically
5 Arline T. Geronimus & Sanders Korenman, The Socioeconomic Consequences of Teen
Childbearing Reconsidered, 107 Q.J. ECON. 1187, 1196 (1992) (simple comparison of
populations shows that women who bore their first child after age 19 enjoyed an income that
was more than 400/ higher than the incomes of women who had children during their teenaged
years); Sandra L. Hofferth & Kristin A. Moore, Earl Childbearing and Later Economic Well-
Being, 44 AM Soc. REV. 784 (1979); James Tnussell, Economic Consequences of Teenage
Childbearing, in TEENAGE SEXUAuiY, PREGNANCY, AND CHILDEEARING 251 (Frank F.
Furstenber, Jr. etal. eds., 1981).
6 Geroimus & Koremnn, supra note 5, at 1196 (in one sample, nearly one fifth of
women who had bom their first child as teenagers were on welfare in 1982, while only 5% of
women who had deferred childbearing were on welfare in that year).
7 Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr. et al., The Children of Teenage Mothers: Patterns of Early
Childbearing in Two Generations, 22 FAM. PLAN. PERsP. 54 (1990); Joan R Kahn & Kay E.
Anderson, Intergenerational Patterns of Teenage Fertility, 29 D2EOGRAPHY 39 (1992); see
also Leighton Ku et al., Factors Influencing First Intercourse for Teenage Men, 108 PuB.
HEALTH REP. 680, 685 (1993) (sons of teenaged mothers begin sexual activity significantly
earlier than sons of other women).
8 Klerman, supra note 1, at 92; Sam Shapiro et al., Relevance of Correlates of Infant
Deaths for Significant Morbidity at 1 Year of Age, 136 AM J. OBS nCS & GYNECOLOGY
363 (1980); Brent Taylor et al., Teenage Mothering, Admission to Hospital, and Accidents
During the First 5 Years, 58 ARCHIVE OF DISEASE IN CHILDH 6 (1983); Sandra L.
Hofferth, The Children of Teen Childbearers, in 2 RIsKING THE FuruRE 174, 175-81 (Sandra
L. Hofferth & Cheryl D. Hayes eds., 1987).
9 Hofferth, supra note 8, at 181-92; Arline T. Geronimus et al., Does Young Maternal
Age Adversely Affect Child Development? Evidence from Cousin Comparisons in the United
States, 20 POM'AI1ON & DEV. REV. 585, 596 (1994); Kristin A. Moore & Nancy 0. Snyder,
Cognitive Attainment Among Firstborn Children of Adolescent Mothers, 56 AM Soc. REV.
612 (1991) (finding correlation only among white, not black or Hispanic children); Sarah H.
Broman, Longterm Development of Children Born to Teenagers, in TEENAGE PARENTS AND
THER OFFSPRING 195 (Keith G. Scott et al. eds., 1981); J. Brooks-Gunn & Frank F.
Furstenberg, Jr., The Children ofAdolescent Mothers: Physical, Academic, and Psychological
Outcomes, 6 DEvELoIMENTAL REV. 224,244 (1986).10 Klerman, supra note 1, at 93.
1 1 Brooks-G & Furstenberg, supra note 9, at 244. As discussed further below, many of
these differences diminish or disappear after controlling for mother's socioeconomic
background and other factors. See infra notes 65-75 and accompanying text
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reduce poverty and childhood suffering. The disappointment stems from our
political failure, despite this alluring promise, to embrace any of the remedies
most likely to reduce teenaged births.
In this essay, I discuss both the social promise of ending teenaged births
and our political failure to achieve that goal. Somewhat ironically, I offer a
small measure of hope on the failure and a larger dose of caution on the
promise. We can significantly reduce teenaged childbearing if we apply our
political will to that goal. The majority of teenaged mothers do not want to bear
children before they turn twenty, 12 and we can help them achieve their own
ends. Other women would decide not to bear children as teenagers if we gave
them realistic educational or employment alternatives to early motherhood.' 3
As a society, it is within our power to choose both of these aspirations, and we
should choose them. It is fair to the mothers, fair to their children, and
advantageous to the rest of society.
Sadly, however, even if we deferred all childbearing until age twenty-five,
we would not end poverty or childhood disadvantage. Teenaged childbearing is
not the root cause of poverty; indeed, it may be more of a symptom than a
cause. Disadvantage, and an economic system that fosters disadvantage, are the
root causes of poverty. Until we grapple with that fundamental truth, we will
12 jaequeline D. Forrest & Susheela Singh, The Sexual and Reproductive Behavior of
American Women, 1982-1988, 22 FAN. PLAN. PERSP. 206, 212 (1990) (between 1984 and
1988, 72.6% of the births among women aged 154o-19 were unintended; 81% of the
piegnancies in that group were unintended). Among younger teenagers, the proportion of
unwanted births is even higher. Kathryn Kost & Jacqueline D. Forrest, Intention Status of US.
Births in 1988: Differences by Mothers' Socioeconomic and Demographic Characteristics,
27 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 11, 14 (1995) (only 22.1% of births to women aged 15-17 were
intended). Somewhat surprisingly, a significant percentage of births to older mothers are also
unwanted or nistimed Among all United States women, about one-third of births occur earlier
than the woman intended, and about one-tenth are completely unwanted. Kost & Forrest, supra,
at 11 (noting the results of two different studies, identifying the number of mistimed births as
between 27.7% and 36.2%, and the number of unwanted births as between 7.0% and 12.2%).
These numbers substantially underestimate the number of unwanted pregnancies, because they
omit pregnancies terminated by abortion before birth. See also Harriet B. Presser, Ears,
Motherhood: Ignorance or Bliss?, in TEENAGE SEXUALrTY, PREGNANCY, AND CHEDBEARING
336, 338 (Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr. et al. eds., 1981) (less than 20% of sample of New York
City teenagers who bore their first child between 1970 and 1972 intended to become pregnant).
Some reports focus on teenagers who actively desire pregnancy and childbirth. See, e.g.,
LEON DASH WHEN CHILDREN WANT CHMDREN (1989); JuDrm S. Mus cK, YoUNG, POOR,
AND PREGNANT (1993). Undoubtedly some teenagers do seek to become pregnant Surveys of
large samples like the ones reported above, however, confirm that the majority of teenagers do
not want to become pregnant or bear children. Further work needs to be done to identify the
teenagers who do desire pregnancy and to determine the reasons for their desires.
13 See infra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
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deceive ourselves over the true causes of the poverty that handicaps more than
one-fifth of our children. 14 In the final sections of this essay, I question the
causal link between teenaged births and poverty. I then show that examination
of this conundrum uncovers a more fundamental problem: Our economic
system no longer enables the poorest adults to support children at even the
subsistence level marked by the poverty line. We must work to reverse that
injustice or we will never save American children from the poverty that
shackles them.
I. THE PROMISE: CAN WE REDUCE TEENAGED CHILDBEARING?
After several decades of strong empirical research, we know that at least
three types of programs significantly reduce teenaged childbearing: (1)
comprehensive sex education programs, especially when those classes are
linked to the provision of contraceptives; (2) initiatives that make abortions
readily available and affordable for teenagers; and (3) programs that offer
underprivileged teenagers realistic employment or educational goals. 15 I briefly
examine each of these options below.
A. Sex Education and Contraceptives
Today, most schools offer some form of sex education. 16 The content of
those programs varies widely, and assessments of their effectiveness also
vary.' 7 Repeated studies, however, show that sex education can significantly
reduce teenaged pregnancy if the programs include five features: (1) specific,
accurate information about both the risks of unprotected intercourse and the
methods of avoiding those risks; (2) consistent reinforcement of individual
values and group norms against taking sexual risks; (3) reliance upon social
learning theory and active learning methods; (4) consideration of social
pressures to have unprotected sex; and (5) practice in communication,
negotiation, and resistance skills.' 8 Today we teach teenagers how to drive,
14 n 1993, 22% of United States children lived in poverty. UN rD STATES DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, STAT. ABSTRACT oF mE UNrr STATES 480 (115th ed. 1995).
15 See generally Robert D. Plotnick, The Effect of Social Policies on Teenage Pregnancy
and Childbearing, 1993 FAMILiES IN Soc'Y: J. CONTEMP. HUM. SERvICES 324; Klerman, supra
note 1, at 94-98.
16 Douglas Kirby et al., School-Based Programs to Reduce Sexual Risk Behaviors: A
Review ofEffectiveness, 109 PUB. HEALTH REP. 339, 340 (1994).
17 Id. at 345.
18 Id. at 354-55 (reviewing almost two dozen studies of school-based sex education
programs); William A. Firestone, The Content and Context of Sexuality Education: An
[V/ol. 57:441
CUT7NG 7EENAGED BIRTHS
how to use computers, and how to execute complex plays in the heat of a
football game. If we want to, we can also teach them how to avoid pregnancy
and childbearing.
Sex education is even more effective when it is joined with community
education and contraceptive clinics. Programs in both impoverished rural
counties and blighted urban centers have shown that these more comprehensive
initiatives dramatically reduce pregnancy and childbearing among
underprivileged teenagers-those who are at most risk of early childbearing. 19
Program evaluations also demonstrate that both sex education and distribution
of contraceptives can cut teenaged childbearing without significantly increasing
sexual activity.20 In fact, several studies have demonstrated a significant
decrease in sexual conduct after the institution of sex education or contraceptive
Exploratory Study in One State, 26 FmR AN. PERsp. 125 (1994).
19 Helen P. Koo et al., Reducing Adolescent Pregnancy Through a School-and
Communio,-Based Intervention: Denmark, South Carolina; Revisited, 26 FANL PLAN. PERSP.
206, 206 (1994) (program in Denmark, South Carolina, cut pregnancy rate among 14- to 17-
year-olds in balf-frrn 77 pregnancies per 1000 teenagers to 37 pregnancies per 100--while
pregnancy rate in similar counties showed smaller decline or increased; differences were
statistically significant); JANET B. HARDY & LAuRiE S. ZABIN, ADOLESCENT PREGNANCY iN AN
URBAN ENVIRO mENr 352 (1991) (program in Baltimore, Maryland, decreased pregnancy rate
by 30.1% after 28 months, while rate in control school increased 57.60%).
Studies of some school-based health clinics report no significant decrease in pregnancy
rates when compared to control schools in the same region. See, e.g., Douglas Kirby et al., Sit
School-Based Clinics: Their Reproductive Health Services and Impact on Sexual Behavior,
23 FA PLAN. PERSP. 6 (1991) [hereinader Kirby et al., Six School-Based Clinics]. The clinics
analyzed in this study, however, either did not provide contraceptives on site, failed to focus on
pregnancy prevention, or engaged in little outreach among the students. Id. at 14-15. Notably,
the researchers found that between 62% and 89% of the students who became pregnant in these
schools did so before receiving any contraceptive counseling from the clinic staff Id. at 14. The
authors accordingly recommended that if school clinics desire to reduce pregnancy, they should
place a high priority on that goal, develop outreach programs, and make contraceptives
available on site. Id. at 16; see also Douglas Kirby et al., The Effects of School-Based Health
Clinics in St Paul on School-Wide Birthrates, 25 FAM. PLAN. PERsP. 12 (1993) (finding that
school health clinics in St. Paul, Minnesota, bad no significant impact on pregnancy rates, but
noting that the community bad low teenaged birth rates even before institution of the clinics;
clinics also lacked the power to dispense contraceptives on site).
2 0 HARDY & ZABIN, supra note 19, at 348-49 (school-based clinics that distributed free
contraceptives in Baltimore did not increase sexual activity); Kirby et al., Sit School-Based
Clinics, supra note 19 (health clinics in three schools that dispensed contraceptives on site, as
well as one that gave vouchers for free birth control pills, did not significantly increase sexual
activity when compared to control schools; test schools located in widely different regions);
Kirby et al., supra note 16, at 352-53 (studies repeatedly demonstrate that sex education does
not increase sexual activity).
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clinics. 21 We can educate teenagers about sex, and even offer them birth
control, without significantly increasing their sexual activity.
B. Aboion
The second type of programs that demonstrably reduce teenaged
childbearing are initiatives that make legalized abortions more accessible and
affordable to teenagers. When New York liberalized its abortion laws in 1970,
birthrates in New York City fell 18.7% among black teenagers and 14.1%
among white teenagers. 22 Similar effects occurred nationwide as abortion bans
succumbed to judicial or legislative attack23a
More recent comparisons among states confirm that, at least for white
21 HARDy & ZABIN, supra note 19, at 348 (exposure to 28-month program that included
fiee access to contraceptives delayed sexual initiation from a median age of 15 years, 7 months,
to a median age of 16 years, 2 months); id. at 353 (statistical models used to analyze decrease in
pregnancy rate among population exposed to comprehensive sex education program, including
free access to contraceptives, "suggest that the reductions were due as much to reductions in
coital firequency as they were to improved contraception"); Kirby et al., Sir School-Based
Clinics, supra note 19, at 11 (at a school providing vouchers for birth control pills, significantly
fewer women reported ever having sex than did women in a control school that did not dispense
vouchers; at one school dispensing contraceptives on site, significantly fewer men had engaged
in sex than at a control school where contraceptives were not dispensed; in both that school and
a second school dispensing contraceptives on site, the mean age at first intercourse was higher
for either men or women than at control schools that did not dispense contaceptives); Kirby et
al., supra note 16, at 352 ('[T]wo curriculums that specified delaying the onset of intercourse
as a clear goal ... successfully reduced the proportion of sexually inexperienced students who
initiated sex during the following 12 to 18 months. Notably, both groups also received
instruction on contraception."); id. at 353 (one of these programs also significantly reduced the
frequency of intercourse among students who did initiate sex after beginning the program);
Leighton C. Ku et al., The Association of AIDS Education and Sex Education with Sexual
Behavior andCondom Use Among Teenage Men, 24 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 100, 103 (1992) (sex
education that included training in resistance skills "was associated with significant reductions
both in the number of sexual partners in the last year and in the frequency of intercourse").
22 Theodore j. Joyce & Naci H Mocan, The Impact of LegalizedAbortion on Adolescent
Childbearing in New York City, 80 AM J. PUn. HEALTH 273, 277 (1990). Joyce and Mocan
speculate that teen use of abortions may have grown since 1970, meaning that the relationship
between teen births and accessible abortions is even stronger today than it was twenty-five years
ago. Id at 277-78.
23 See Kristin A. Moore & Steven B. Caldwell, The Effect of Government Policies on
Out-of-Wedlock Sex ard Pregnancy, 9 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 164, 167 (1977) (noting that the
"wide availability of legal abortion ha[d] a strong, statistically significant impact on pregnancy
outcome" in the early nineteen seventies).
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teenagers, liberal abortion laws correspond to significantly lower birth rates. 24
These "liberal" states do not require parental consent for a minor's abortion
and impose fewer restrictions on second-trimester abortions. 5 States that offer
publicly funded abortions also enjoy significantly lower teen birthrates. 6 The
relationships for black teenagers are not as plain, partly because those teens
significantly underreport both pregnancies and abortions. 27 At least one study,
however, demonstrates a significant relationship between availability of
abortion and births to black teenagers.
28
Overall, teenagers terminate 42% of their pregnancies through abortion-
twice the rate for women between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-four.
29
24 Shelly Lundberg & Robert D. Plotnick Effects of State Welfare, Abortion and Family
Planing Policies on Premarital Childbearing Among White Adolescents, 22 FAM. PLAN.
PERsP. 246, 247 (1990) [hereinafter Lundberg & Plotnick, Abortion and Family Planning]
(findings limited to white teenagers); Shelly Lundberg & Robert D. Plotnick, Adolescent
Premarital Childbearing: Do Economic Incentives Matter?, 13 J. LAB. ECON. 177, 177 (1995)
[heminafter Lundberg & Plotnick, Economic Incentives] (findings limited to white teenagers);
Susheela Singh, Adolescent Pregnancy in the United States: An Interstate Analysis, 18 FAM
PLAN. PEmsP. 210, 215 (1986) (index of nonrestrictive abortion policies significantly related to
abortion rate for all teenagers as a group and for black teenagers as a subgroup).
2 5 See Lundberg & Plotnick, Abortion and Famil Planning, supra note 24, at 248. The
social attitudes in states maintaining liberal abortion laws may be as important as the laws
themselves in enhancing teen access to abortions. Id. at 251. Whether the effect is legal,
cultural, or a combination of those two factors, teen birthrates are significantly lower in states
that regulate abortion more lightly.
Other researchers have used somewhat different measures of abortion accessibility,
combining the percentage of the population living in counties with facilities that regularly
perform abortions with the abortion rate for adult women. Singh, supra note 24, at 216.26 Lundberg & Plotnick, Abortion and Family Planning, supra note 24, at 249 (white
teenagers); Lundberg & Plotnick, Economic Incentives, supra note 24, at 190 (white
teenagers); Mark I. Evans et al., The Fiscal Impact of the Medicaid Abortion Funding Ban in
Michigan, 82 O ~sIMRCS & GYEcOLOGY 555, 556 (1993) (about one-fifth of pregnant
women eligible for Medicaid would opt for abortion if public finds were available; without
funding, they cany their pregnancies to term); Singh, supra note 24, at 211-13 (black
teenagers).
27 Lundberg & Plotnick, Economic Incentives, supra note 24, at 190. This study identified
no significant relationship between liberal abortion laws and the birthrate for black teenagers.
Id at 189. Indeed, Lundberg and Plotnick found a significant negative relationship between
public funding of abortions and abortion rates for black teens. Id. at 189. They cautioned,
however, that their sample of black teenagers was small and that analyses of births to black
teenagers suffer from the reporting defects noted above. Id at 190. For these reasons, they
"place[d] little confidence in any of the[ir] findings for blacks," id. at 190, and urged further
study of the relationship between abortion funding and birthrate for black teenagers.
2 8 Singh, supra note 24, at 216.
29 Forrest & Singh, supra note 12, at 213.
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Abortion remains controversial in our society, but any discussion of teenaged
births cannot ignore the fact that births rise as access to abortion goes down.
C. Education and Employment Oppotunities
The final set of programs that would reduce teenaged births are plans that
give teenagers realistic educational and employment goals to take the place of
early pregnancy and childbearing. Hope and ambition replace the self-doubt
and resignation that often lead to teenaged births.
Many studies trace a relationship between early childbearing and lack of
employment or educational opportunities. Teenagers who are enrolled in
school, maintain better grades, and have high educational and career
aspirations, are less likely to deliver babies than are other teens.30 Conversely,
teenagers who live in neighborhoods with high unemployment rates and low
wages are significantly more likely than other teens to bear children. 31
Substantial evidence, in other words, suggests that teenagers who see no
economic future for themselves are most likely to fall into pregnancy and then
accept early childbirth. The alternatives simply are not strong enough to pull
them in the other direction. 32
3 0 Chong-Bum An et al., Teen Out-of-Wedlock Births and Welfare Receipt: The Role of
Childhood Events and Economic Circumstances, 75 REv. OF EcoN. & STAT. 195 (1993);
Randall I-1 ing et al., The Demand for Abortion by Unmarried Teenagers: Economic
Factors, Age, Ethnicit, and Religiosity Matter, 51 AM J. ECON. & Soc. 223 (1992); Arleen
Leibowitz et al., An Economic Model of Teenage Pregnancy Decision-Making, 23
MOGRAPHY 67 (1986); Dawn M. Upchurch & James McCarthy, The Timing of a First Birth
and High School Completion, 55 AM. Soc. REV. 224 (1990); Dennis P. Hogan et al., Social
and Environmental Factors Influencing Contraceptive Use Among Black Adolescents, 17
FAM. PLAN. PEWs. 165 (1985); Robert D. Plotnick The Effects of Attitudes on Teenage
Premarital Pregnancy and Its Resolution, 57 AML Soc. REV. 800 (1992); Hofferth & Moore,
supra note 5, at 797.3 1 King et al., supra note 30; T. Paul Schultz, Marital Status and Fertility in the United
States: Welfare and Labor Market Effects, 29 J. HuM. REsouRcEs 637, 656 (1994) (an
increase in women's wages is significantly associated with reduced childbearing, especially
among black women between the ages of 15 and 24); see also Greg J. Duncan & Saul D.
Hoffman, Welfare Benefits, Economic Opportunities, and Out-of-Wedlock Births Among
Black Teenage Girls, 27 DEMoGRAPHY 519, 523 (1990) (positive career opportunities and
marriage prospects significantly reduce likelihood of births among black teenagers). But see An
et al., supra note 30, at 207 (finding no significant relationship between neighborhood
economic conditions and unwed teen pregnancies).
32 Sociologists dub this explanation of teenaged childbearing the "nothing to lose" or
"low opportunity cost" hypothesis. For additional articulations of this hypothesis, see Wnimti
J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CrrY, THE UNDERCLASS AND PUBLIC
PouCY (1987); Elijah Anderson, Sex Codes and Family Life Among Poor Inner-City Youths,
[Vol. 57:441
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We do not yet have a large body of careful studies on the effects of
employment or education programs on teenaged childbearing. A few programs,
however, report encouraging results. Between 1978 and 1980, the Youth
Incentive Entitlement Pilot Projects offered part-time jobs during the school
year, and full-time jobs during the summer, to male and female high school
students from low-income households. 33 Sufficient jobs were available for all
youths who qualified for the program; more than 80,000 teenagers in seventeen
locations participated in the scheme.34 A matched comparison of four of these
program sites with similar neighborhoods lacking the program showed that job
availability significantly reduced teenaged childbearing.35 Indeed, a ten percent
increase in teen jobs cut the probability of teen births by more than fifteen
percent.
36
A few other demonstration programs also report reductions in teen
birthrates by offering underprivileged teenagers jobs, mentors, or opportunities
to aid the community through volunteer work.37 More empirical work needs to
be done in this area, but raising self-esteem, cultivating ambition, and offering
hope for the future appear to be vital elements in reducing teen childbearing.
In sum, we could reduce teenaged childbearing substantially within the
next three years if we enhanced sex education programs, made contraceptives
readily available to teenagers, increased access to and public funding for
abortion, and offered jobs or better training to disadvantaged youths. Even one
of these programs would significantly cut the rate of teenaged births. If we
501 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sc. 59 (1989).
33 See Randall j. Olsen & George Farkas, The Effect of Economic Opportunil, and
Family Background on Adolescent Cohabitation and Childbearing Among Low-Income
Blacks, 8 J. LAB. ECON. 341, 342-43 (1990). Both academic-year and summer jobs paid the
minimum wage. Id. at 343. Youths had to remain enrolled in school to qualify for the jobs. Id.
34 Id. at 343, 347.
35 Id at 343, 351. The researchers limited their analysis to black teenagers because they
comprised the majority of participants. Id. at 347.
36 1d. at 353. Increased job availability also significantly increased marriage or
cohabitation among these underprivileged teenagers. Id. at 351.
3 7 Joseph P. Allen et al., School-Based Prevention of Teenage Pregnancy and School
Dropout: Process Evaluation of the National Replication of the Teen Outreach Progran, 18
Am 3. COmuNrY PsyaioL. 505 (1990) (describing program that combined classroom
counseling with involvement of teens in volunteer projects); THEoDoRE 00M & LISA
HERENDEEN, AMME AN ASSOIATION FOR MARRIAGE AND FAMILy THERAPY, TEENAGE
PREGNANCY PREVENTION PROGRAMS: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED? MEETING FHGHLIGHTS AND
BA KGROuND BRMFN REPORT: REPoRT OF AFAMILY IMPACr SEMINAR (1989).
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doubt our ability to have an impact on teenaged pregnancies and births, we
only need to look at the rest of the world. The United States has the highest
teenaged pregnancy rate among developed nations.38 Our teenagers become
pregnant twice as often as Canadian or English teenagers, three times as often
as Swedish teenagers, and seven times as often as teens from the Netherlands. 39
Those countries have discovered no secret elixir to promote chastity or inhibit
fertility. They have simply pursued policies that we have refused to implement.
I. THE FAmURE: WHY HAVE WE BEEN UNABLE TO REDUCE TEEN
CHILDBEARING?
If we know what works in reducing teenaged childbearing, and if other
developed nations have been able to make strides towards that goal, why have
we been so unwilling to adopt effective remedies? The answer is not cost.
Studies repeatedly show that sex education, contraceptive clinics, and publicly
funded abortions are cost-effective in avoiding the more substantial burdens of
teenaged births.4" Educational and employment programs are more expensive,
especially if they guarantee jobs to teenagers, but there is hope that these
programs too could pay for themselves.41
Part of the answer is morality. Sex education, contraceptives, and abortion
provoke strong moral reactions in the American public. In this area, however,
the true moral majority sometimes fails to assert itself. Communities neglect to
implement comprehensive sex education programs even when the
overwhelming majority of local residents support those classes.42 There has
38 Stanley K Henshaw & Jennifer Van Vort, Teenage Abortion, Birth and Pregnancy
Statistics: An Update, 21 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 85, 87 (1989); Elise F. Jones et al, Teemge
Pregnmcy in Developed Countries: Detenninants and Policy Implications, 17 FAM. PLAN.
PERsP. 53,54 (1985).
39 Jones et al., supra note 38, at 55.
40 CENI FOR PoPuLATIoN OPTIONs, TEENAGE PREGNANCY AND Too-EARLY
CHLDBEARIN: PUBuC CosTs, PERSONAL CONSEQUENcES (6th ed. 1992); Evans et al., supra
note 26; Joyce & Mocan, supra note 22, at 278; see also Martha R. Burt & Frank Levy,
Estimates of Public Costs for Teenage Childbearing: A Review of Recent Studies and
Estimates of 1985 Public Costs, in 2 RISKING THE FuruRE, supra note 8, at 264 (summarizing
studies calculating costs of teen childbearing and showing how to compare those costs with the
costs of progrars designed to reduce teen childbearing).
4 1 See Janet Reis, Costs and Benefits of Deferred Teenage Births,'14 EVALUA'ION &
PR Am PLAN. 63 (1991) (outlining heavy costs of teen births and suggesting that prevention
generally is cost effective).
42 Firestone, supra note 18, at 130 (noting that although 87% of the public in New Jersey
supports offering sex education in junior and senior high schools, and 86% specifically approve
teaching about contraceptive methods and safer sex, opponents of sex education repeatedly
[Vol. 57:441
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been no rush to distribute condoms in high schools, even though as many as
two-thirds of adults nationwide say they would support that result.43 And our
morality regarding abortion is curiously mixed: Three-quarters of American
adults support a woman's right to terminate an unwanted pregnancy under
some circumstances, 44 and most private health insurance plans pay for the
procedure, 45 yet the majority of Americans oppose Medicaid funding of
abortion.46 Moral sensibility alone does not explain why abortion is a choice
for women with wealth or private health insurance, but not for women without
either. And morality alone cannot explain our failure to address teen pregnancy
more aggressively.
Sexism shoulders a second share of blame for our inadequate response to
teen childbearing. The cost of teenaged births falls largely on teenaged women,
rather than men. Each year, ten percent of all teenaged women discover that
they are pregnant and confront the prospect of diminished schooling and
depleted futures. 47 If one in ten teenaged men faced such a substantial threat to
their economic futures, we probably would declare a national emergency. But
our nation consistently devotes more attention, and more resources, to the
problems of men than those of women.48 And we are still more likely to see
attack those classes, administrative support for sex education is low, and programs are not as
comprehensive as they should be; this "discrepancy between the effectiveness of opposition to
sexuality education and the supportiveness of public opinion remains a puzzle"). In January of
1995, an ABC Newspoll of more than 1,000 adults nationwide revealed that 77% support sex
education courses in schoools. Survey, ABC NEws, Feb. 17,1995, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Cumws File, Accession No. 0238681.
43 Kirby et al., supra note 16, at 341. A January 1995 poll of more than 1,000 adults
yielded a slightly lower majority (59%) favoring the distribution of condoms or other
contraceptives through school health clinics. Survey, ABC NEws, Feb. 17, 1995, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File, Accession No. 0238702.
44 See, e.g., After Roe vs. Wade, SAN FRANSCO CHRON., Jan. 24, 1995, at A20
(according to a CBS poll conducted in January 1995, 75% of the American public "favors
making abortion either generally available or available with some limits"); Bob Minzesheimer,
Gra'nm Sees No Consensus for Constitutional Change, USA TODAY, Mar. 13, 1995, at 8A
(noting that a USA Today/CNN/Gallup Poll conducted in February 1995 found that 32% of
adults thought abortion should be legal under any circumstances; 9% supported legality under
"most" circumstances; and 41% would permit abortion under "certain" circumstances).
45 MacNeil Lehrer News Hour (Aug. 9, 1994) (two-thirds of private health insurance
plans cover the costs of abortion).
46 According to a July 1994 poll of 3,800 adults, only 43% favor Medicaid funding
abortions, while 55% oppose using those fbnds for abortions. Survey, TIMes MMROR, Sept. 21,
1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File.
47 Rate of Births For Teen-Agers Drops Again, N.Y. TIME, Sept. 22, 1995, at A18
(reporting estimate by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention).
4 1 See, e.g., AAUW EDUC. FOUND. & NAT'L EDUC. ASS'N, How SCHOOLS SHORTCHANGE
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boys, rather than girls, as future breadwinners whose economic potential must
be protected. The fact that teenaged births are a female problem has enhanced
our willingness to rely upon private solutions (such as strengthening family
values) rather than to seek systematic social intervention.
Racism, finally, must accept part of the blame for our failure to confront
teenaged childbearing. Teenaged births are disproportionately high among
teenagers of color; the birthrate among those teens is more than twice as high
as the rate among white teens. 49 Nonwhite teenagers, moreover, account for
the majority of births to teens under age fifteen.50 Just as our society responds
more forcefully to the needs of men than those of women, we address the
problems of our white majority more readily than we remedy those of minority
races. Adult black men already suffer from an unemployment rate of 13.4%,51
yet we have not declared a national emergency to address that problem. The
same unemployment crisis undoubtedly would goad us into action if white men
were affected as severely. 52 Similarly, identification of teenaged childbearing
GmLs: A Si'nY OF MAO FINDrINGS ON GIRLS AND FDUCATION (1992) (documenting manner
in which the educational system devotes more attention to the needs of boys than girls);
MARILYN FRENCH, TE WAR AGAINST WOMEN (1992) (outlining systemic discrimination
against wonen in a variety of cultures).
49 Kristin A. Moore et al., StatisticaiAppendix: Trends in Adolescent Sexual and Fertility
Behavior, in 2 RISKiNG UE FuuR, supra note 8, at 353, 457 (showing that in 1984, 42.5 of
every 1000 white teenagers between the ages of 15 and 19 gave birth, while 95.7 of every 1000
black teenagers in that age range gave birth). Because whites comprise a larger percentage of
our population, births to white teenagers still outnumber births to teens of color by more than
two-to-one. Id. at 454 (showing that 324,912 white teenagers bore babies in 1984, compared to
154,735 nonwhite teenagers). The high rate of teenaged childbearing among minority
populations, however, combined with the fact that nonwhite teens are less likely to many their
sexual partners, feeds the perception that teenaged births are linked to race.
50 1d. (reporting that in 1984, 6,006 nonwhite teenagers under age 15, compared to 3,959
white teenagers under that age, gave birth).
51Rebecca M Blank, The Employment Strategy: Public Policies to Increase Work and
Earnings, in CONFRoN1rNG POVERTY: PRESCmITONS FOR CHANGE 168, 171 (Sheldon R
Danziger et al. eds., 1994) (reporting unemployment figures for 1992).52 The unemployment rate for adult white men is less than half the rate for adult black
men: about 6.3% (1992 figures). Blank, supra note 51, at 171; cf David Holmstrom, Why
Young Afiican-American Men Fill US Jails, CHRSTiAN SOL MoNrrOR, Oct. 5, 1995, at 12
(quoting Marc Mauer, coauthor of a report showing that one out of every three black men in
their twenties is under the supervision of the criminal justice system, as saying: "If these
numbers were for young white men, the nation would declare a national emergency.").
Our differential response to the needs of white and black citizens produces sharp
disparities in overall well-being. A recent United Nations survey found that white Americans
lead the world in well-being, while black Americans rank twenty-seventh when compared to
the citizens of other nations. Reena Shah Stamets, Report Finds Poor Nations Improving, ST.
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with black and Hispanic-Americans has made the problem less pressing to the
political majority.
Morality, sexism, and racism are important, but these three answers do not
explain the entire puzzle of our failure to diminish teenaged childbearing. Our
society has made remarkable changes since 1930, changes that overturned
settled economic expectations, challenged deeply held cultural beliefs, offended
religious sensibilities, and benefited both women and racial minorities. We
created a state-run retirement system and health plan for the aged; ended de
jure racial segregation; outlawed both sex and race discrimination in schools,
workplaces, and public accommodations; and admitted a significant number of
white women, women of color, and men of color to high-status, high-paying
jobs. All of these steps were hard at the time, but we accomplished them and
continue to work at them. Why have we been unable to do the same with
remedies for teenaged childbearing?
Perhaps we fail to address teenaged births more aggressively because that
problem shields us from a deeper dilemma we are unwilling to face. The
United States now has the most unequal distribution of both wealth and income
in the Western world.53 In 1994, the top fifth of American families took home
49.1% of the country's aggregate income, the highest share yet recorded by the
census bureau. 54 The bottom fifth of American families secured only 3.6% of
that income. 55 The top one percent of American families now control nearly
forty percent of the country's wealth. 56 And these income inequalities exist
after the government cash transfers like AFDC payments, unemployment
compensation, and social security that we like to think are so generous. 57 This
PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 18, 1995, at 2A. Hispanic-American citizens rank a dismal thirty-
second when compared to the citizens of other nations. The U.N. estimate of "well-being"
includes such measues as life expectancy, adult literacy rate, and economic purchasing power.
Differences of this magnitude suggest that our society systematically, and over time, has
responded moe readily to the problems of white Americans than to those ofminorty races.
53 Keith Bradshm, Gap in Wealth in US. Called W Idest in West, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17,
1995, at Al.
54 Census Data Show Only High-Income Households Have Recovered Fully from
Recession, U.S. NEWSWmE, Oct. 9, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File
[hereinafter cited Census Data article].
55 Id. These figures represent the most recent extremes of an income polarization that
began in 1969. See Sheldon R. Danziger & Daniel H. Weinberg, The Historical Record:
Trends in Faniy Income, Inequality, aid Poverty, in CONFRONrmG POVERTY: PRESCRITONS
FOR CHANGE,supranote 51, at 18,23.
56 Bradsher, supra note 53, at D4.
57 Danziger & Weinberg, supra note 55, at 20. The measures do not include in-kind
benefits (such as Medicaid or food stamps) and do not subtact taxes paid. Id. The omission of
taxes actually understates the extent of current inequality because high-income families reaped
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is how unequal our society has become, even before any further rending of our
safety net.
Nor should we pretend that Americans at the bottom of this income chasm
are prosperous compared to the poor in other countries. The purchasing power
of low-wage Americans is substantially lower than that of "low-wage workers
in virtually all other advanced countries." 58 Those nations also supplement the
wages of their workers with more health benefits and social services than we
do.59 The poor in this country are worse off in both relative and absolute terms
when compared to the poor in other advanced nations.
In our hearts, we suspect that this inequality cannot foster equal
opportunity. Empirical research bears out that surmise: Even after controlling
for factors like ability, educational attainment, and personal aspirations, family
income significantly influences the success of children.6° Our nation is not one
of level playing fields or equally metered relays. It is one of gross inequality,
where one out of every three children born in wealth will remain in the top
income quintile as an adult, while only one in every fifty children born in
poverty will reach that pinnacle.61
Yet this country was founded on the notion of equality, especially equality
of opportunity. 62 To reconcile those beliefs with the reality of inequality and
significant benefits from tax reforms during the nineteen eighties. "As a result, post-tax income
inequality increased even more over the 1980s than did pretax inequality." Id. at 25.
58 Richard D. Freeman, Lessons For the United States, in WORKING UNDER DtFEEREr
RULES 223, 226 (Richard B. Freeman ed., 1994).
59 Id.
60 W1LUAM H. SEWELL & ROBERT MI HAUSER, EDUCATION, OCCUPATION, AND
EARNes: AcHEveM iN THE EARLY CAREER (1975); Martha S. Hill & Greg J. Duncan,
Parental Fanily Income and the Socioeconomic Attainment of Children, 16 Soc. ScL RES. 39
(1987); Christopher Jencks et al., The Wisconsin Model of Status Attainment: A National
Replication with Improved Measures ofAbility and Aspiration, 56 Soc. OF EDuc. 3 (1983);
see also Sara McLanahan, Family Structure and the Reproduction of Poverty, 90 An J. Soc.
873, 897 (1985) (explaining that low income, rather than single parenting, reduces likelihood
that children will complete school). Individual ability, motivation, and eduational attainment, of
course, also significantly affect a child's success in life.
6 1 Greg J. Duncan, The Economic Environment of Childhood, in CHILDREN N POVERTY
23, 42 (Aletha C. Huston ed., 1991). Conversely, 43% of children raised in the bottom income
quintile remain in that quintile as adults. Id. Only 9% of children raised in the most affluent
quintile drop to the bottom fiflh as adults. Id.
62 Absolute equality of opportunity may be chimerical in any society combining
private enterprise, differential incomes, and family-centered childcare. In those societies,
children from different families will never have identical opportunities to succeed.
Commitment to an ideal, however, may tolerate some divergence from the absolute. The
difficulty we face today is that the gap between ideal and reality has widened to the point
where we must begin to question the genuineness of our commitment to the ideal.
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poverty today, we must be able to identify personal choices as the root of
poverty. Teenaged childbearing is the perfect candidate. We tell ourselves that
some teenagers choose to become pregnant, or foolishly permit themselves to
get pregnant. Those choices, we want to believe, explain their poverty, the
destitution of their children, and the cycles of disadvantage now evident in our
poorest neighborhoods. We can feel sorry for these women and children, we
can extend charity to them, but we don't need to feel responsible because we
tell ourselves that they had the same chance to become lawyers, doctors, and
social workers as our own children do-and they chose a different path instead.
Perhaps we don't move more vigorously to end teenaged childbearing
because we intuit the final part of my story, the fact that eliminating teenaged
births will not end poverty. Suppose we dramatically reduced teenaged
childbearing and then discovered that our economy still did not produce enough
jobs, at high enough wages, to permit all healthy twenty-five-olds to marry and
bear children without sinking below the poverty line? Then what would we do?
III. Is TEENAGED CHILDBEARING THE ROOT CAUSE OF POVERTY?
The time has come to ask whether teenaged childbearing really causes
poverty. I began this essay with a list of socioeconomic evils that correlate with
teenaged births: lost schooling, low wages, poor health, child abuse, and
welfare dependence. Simple correlations, however, fail to account for the fact
that teenaged mothers are not randomly drawn from our population. Teen
mothers come overwhelmingly from disadvantaged socioeconomic
backgrounds. 63 They are also disproportionately likely to have suffered
histories of physical and sexual abuse.64 Does teenaged childbearing cause poor
63 Geroimus & Korman, supranote 5, at 1196.
64 See AAUW Eouc. FOUND. & NAT'L EDuc. ASS'N, supra note 48, at 38 (61% of
pregnant teens and teen mothers reported an unwanted sexual encounter the women's average
age at the time of these ecounters was 11.5 years) (citing study by the Illinois Ounce of
Prevention Fund); Debra Boyer & David Fine, Sexual Abuse as a Factor in Adolescent
Pregnacmy and Child Maltreatment, 24 FAU PLAN. PERSP. 4, 8 (1992) (Two-thirds of
teenagers associated with community or school programs for pregnant or parenting teens had
been sexually abused, and another tenth had been physically abused. Forty-four percent of the
teenagers had been coerced into sexual relations; average age of the woman at first coercion was
13.3, while average age of the perpetrator was 22.6.); Janice R. Butler & Linda M. Burton,
Rethinking Teenage Childbearing: Is Sexual Abuse a Missing Link?, 39 FAM REL. 73, 73
(1990) (more than half of 41 teen mothers had at least one sexually abusive experience before
turning 18); Harold P. Gershenson et al., The Prevalence of Coercive Se=al Experience
Among Teenage Mothers, 4 J. INERPERsoNAL VENCE 204, 209-10 (1989) (reporting that
almost two-thirds of 333 pregnant teenagers participating in a voluntary parenting program had
suffered at least one unwanted sexual experience before becoming pregnant).
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outcomes for these mothers and their children, or do disadvantaged
backgrounds produce those outcomes?
To answer this question, we must try to determine how the children of
teenaged mothers would have fared if those same mothers had postponed
childbearing until later years. A growing literature suggests that socioeconomic
factors and family background have a far greater effect on parent/child welfare,
while teenaged childbearing has less of an effect, than we traditionally have
assumed. This literature also suggests that the effects of teenaged childbearing
vary among different racial groups.
One recent study found that after controlling for both the mother's
cognitive achievement and the quality of the child's home environment, the
children of teenaged black and Hispanic mothers had higher cognitive scores
than the children of black or Hispanic mothers who postponed their
childbearing. 65 Among white children, teenaged childbearing had no effect on
cognitive development after controlling for home environment and mother's
cognitive achievement; the children of white teens fared as well as children
born to older white mothers.66 Another analysis of more than 1,700 first
cousins found little evidence that birth to a teen mother impaired home
environment, child behavior, or .cognitive development. 67 Indeed, after
controlling for socioeconomic status and family background, the children of
teen mothers fared significantly better on three outcomes than did first cousins
born to older mothers.68 No significant differences favored the children of
nonteen mothers.
Similarly, recent studies suggest that early maternal age alone does not
significantly impair child health. One pair of investigators found that children
born to teenaged mothers would not weigh significantly more if those mothers
deferred childbearing. 69 Studies have also suggested that, at least for
65 Moore & Snyder, supra note 9.
6 Id. at 592.67 au-j s et al., supra note 9, at 596.
68 Id. This study controlled for family background by analyzing the development of
children born to sisters, where at least one sister started childbearing in her teens and the
other(s) deferred childbirth until after age 19. Id. at 592. Even the children of very young
teenaged mothers (those who gave birth before age 18) fared significantly better than the
children of older mothers on two outcomes. Id. at 598.
69 Mark R Rosenzweig & Kenneth I. Wolpin, Sisters, Siblings, ard Mothers: The Effect
of Teen-Age Childbearing on Birth Outcomes in a Dynamic Fazmni Context, 63
ECONOMEnuCA 303, 311 (1995); see also Arline T. Geronimus, The Effects of Race,
Residence, and Prenatal Care on the Relationship ofMaternal Age to Neonatal Mortality, 76
AM J. PUB. HEALTH 1416, 1420 (1986) (revealing that the relationship between teenaged
births and negative outcomes like preterm birth, low birthweight, and neonatal death is
confounded by other factors); Aline T. Geronimus & Sanders Korenman, Maternal Youth or
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disadvantaged black women, babies may be healthier when born to mothers in
their teens than to older women. 70 Controlling for socioeconomic background,
finally, substantially diminishes the difference between teenage and older
mothers in reports of child abuse.71
These conclusions must be viewed with caution, because the studies
continue to suggest some independent effect of teenaged childbearing. At least
some analyses continue to show that teen births significantly reduce family
income, although these effects are considerably smaller after controlling for the
mother's background. 72 Early childbearing also impairs the mother's
Family Background? On the Health Disadvantages of Infants with Teenage Mothers, 137
AM. . EPWOmnoGY 213 (1993) (suggesting that many health related problems stem fl-om
family background rather than early birth).
70 Black mothers are significantly less likely to smoke during their teenage years than
later, cutting the prenatal health risks firm sroking. M. Klitsch, US. Fertility Rates Fell
During 1992, Even Among Teenagers, Women Over 30, 27 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 91, 92 (1995)
(reporting that only 4-7% of teenaged black mothers smoke, compared to 21% of black
mothers in thei tlirties). The opposite pattern holds for white mothers. 1d.; see also Trude
Bennett et al., Maternal Marital Status as a Risk Factor for Infant Mortality, 26 FAM PLAN.
PERSP. 252, 254 (1994) (noting that for black teenaged mothers, remaining unwed does not
significantly increase risks of infant mnrtality, in addition, those risks are significantly less for
unwed black teenaged mothers than for older unwed black mothers); Geronimus & Korenman,
supra note 69.
7 1 E. Milling Kinard & Lorraine V. Klemian, Teenage Parenting and Child Abuse: Are
They Related?, 50 AM. J. ORnhPSYCHIATRY 481 (1980); John M. Leventhal et al.,
Reassessment of the Relationship of Perinatal Risk Factors and Child Abuse, 138 AM...
]SEAsEsCF CHILDREN 1034 (1984).
72 Geronimus & Korenman, supra note 5; Hofferth & Moore, supra note 5; S.D. Hoffman
et al.,Reevaluating the Costs of Teenage Childbearing, 30 DeOGRAPHY 1 (1993); Kristin A.
Moore et al., Age at First Childbirth and Later Poverty, 3 J. RES. AOLESCECE 393 (1993).
Hoffman and his associates found that 28% of the teenaged mothers in their sample were poor.
Using a model that controlled for both socioeconomic background and family influences
(through sister comparisons), they estimated that 16% of these women would have been poor if
they had deferred childbearing until their twenties.
Geronimus and Korenman, like Hoffinan, controlled for family background by studying
outcomes for matched pairs of sisters who bore their first child as teens or adults. Geronimos &
Korenmann, supra note 5, at 1189 n.3. Like Hoffman, they found residual effects of teenaged
births on income after controlling for socioeconomic and family background in three different
populations. Id at 1189. In two of the three populations, however, these effects disappeared
after controlling for marital status and high school completion. Id. at 1209-10. Geronimus and
Korenman note the difficulty of disentangling causal relationships among teenaged
childbearin& marital status, and educational completion, id. at 1210, and also warn that
important diffaeremces exist even among sisters. Id. at 1188. For the latter reason, even sister
studies may overestimate the impact of teenaged childbearing on poverty. Id. at 1189.
Geronimus and Korenman conclude that the true effects of teenaged childbearing on poverty
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education, although once again these effects are smaller than previously
believed. 73 There is also evidence that any negative effects differ by race, with
teenaged childbearing having much less impact on the long-term welfare of
black women and their children than on white women and children. 74
We have good reason, in other words, to continue efforts to reduce teen
births. Teenaged childbearing has some impact on poverty, and deferring
childbirth will improve the lot of at least some women and children. At the
same time, these studies sound a warning that poor outcomes for. the children
of teenaged mothers may derive more from poverty than from the teenaged
births themselves. And the studies raise the dispiriting prospect that these
remain unclear. Id at 1211.
Underlying problems in the databases used by both of these studies, see, e.g., Geronimus
& Korenman, supra note 5, at 1190-92, 1206-08, counsel father caution in determining just
how large the effect of teenaged childbearing is on family income and other outcomes. The
studies, however, do demonstrate that these effects are considerably less than simple
correlations of teenaged pregnancy and outcomes might suggest See also Jeff Grogger &
Stephen Bronars, The Socioeconomic Consequences of Teenage Childbearing: Findings from
aNatural Eperiment, 25 FAM. PLAN. PERsP. 156, 159 (1993) (using twin births to estimate
the effects of unplanned teenaged births, and finding that an early unplanned birth significantly
reduced the mohe's income, although the effects were less than usually predicted).
73 Hofferth & Moore, supra note 5; Klepinger et al., supra note 2; Hoffman et al., supra
note 72; Namkee Ahn, Teenage Childbearing and High School Completion: Accounting for
Individual Heterogeneity, 26 FAM. PLAN. PERSp. 17 (1994). Hoffinan and his colleagues
determined that 54% of the teen mothers in their population graduated from high school, and
estimated (relying on sister comparisons) that 72% would have graduated if they had deferred
their childbearing. Hoffman et al., supra note 72.
Ain estimated that white teenaged mothers were only .32 as likely as nonmothers to have
completed high school by age 20. Ahn, supra, at 20. Using a proportional hazards model, Ain
estimated that 25% of this difference was due to the birth itself, 30% to family background
factors, and 45% to individual heterogeneity. Id Postponing childbirth, in other words, would
only address about one-quarter of the education gap. For black women, Ahn found that
teenaged mothers were .47 as likely as nonmothers to graduate from high school before age 20.
Id. The birth accounted for 48% of this gap, family background for 27%, and individual
heterogeneity for 25%. Id. Hispanic teenaged mothers were .35 as likely to graduate from high
school as nonmothers. Id For this group, the teen birth accounted for 31% of the gap, family
background for 20%, and individual heterogeneity for 48%. Id
See also Margaret M. Marini, Women's Educational Attainment and the Timing of Enty
into Parenthood, 49 AM. Soc. REV. 491, 503 (1984) (identifying a significant positive
relationship between teenaged childbearing and school cessation, after controlling for numerous
factors; size of the relationship, however, was smaller than previously anticipated); Moore et al.,
supra note 72, at 416 (teenaged childbearing significantly reduced educational attainment for
lispanic womer, after controlling for a variety of factors, but not for white or black women).
74 See, e.g., Hofferth & Moore, supra note 5, at 808; Moore et al., supra note 72, at 416.
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women and their children might not fare much better even if they deferred
childbearing into their twenties. 75
Examination of broader socioeconomic data confirms this suspicion. In
1994, one-sixth of full-time, year-round American workers earned too little to
support a family of four above the poverty line.76 Similarly, one-third of
American men between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-four now earn too
little to lift a family of four above that poverty line.77 Deferring childbirth until
age twenty-five, forming a stable family unit, and relying upon the wages of a
traditional male worker, in other words, no longer guarantee the ability to raise
children outside the grasp of poverty.
Analyses by economist Rebecca Blank corroborate this bleak picture. In
1989, the bottom fifth of American households received incomes of less than
$12,500.78 About fifteen percent of the adults in that group were married
couples with children.79 In these "traditional" families, seventy-five percent of
the men and forty percent of the women were working-impressive percentages
given the disproportionate impact of unemployment rates on these poorest
families.80 Yet these families lived on an average income of just over $8000
per year, well below the poverty line for a typical family of four.8 1 Most
chilling, these incomes included government cash transfers like social security,
unemployment compensation, and aid to families with dependent children.
For single parents, the numbers are even lower. Among bottom-quintile
families, single women with children lived on an average income of $6,327 per
75 See Geronius & Koremnan, supra note 5, at 1208 (recent findings "suggest that
policy makers may be overly optimistic about the ability of programs that (solely) encourage
delayed childbearing to improve the socioeconomic status of poor women and their children").
Even studies that continue to show some independent effect of teenaged childbearing
demonstrate that those effects are much smaller than previously believed. Those studies amply
buttress the conclusion that elimination ofteenaged births will not alone cure poverty.
76 Census Data article, supra note 54 (reporting analyses based on census tables and
performed by the Center on Budget and Policy Prioities).
77 Steven A- Holmes, Low-Wage Fathers and the Welfare Debate, N.Y. TMEs, Apr. 25,
1995, at A12 (based on 1993 data) (reporting results of study by the Annie E. Casey
Foundation). Both of these figures represent alarming increases in the proportion of working
adults unable to support a traditional family. In 1979, only 12.1% of full-time workers (one in
eight) earned too little to keep a family of four above the poverty line, Census Data article,
supra note 54; and in 1969, only 13.6% of American men earned too little to support a family of
four above that level. Holmes, supra.
78 Blank, supra note 51, at 462 n.6.
79 Id. at 175. In some cases, another relative resided in the household.80 Id.
81 Id. The poverty level for a family of four was $12,675 in 1989. UNrrED STAhS DEP'T
OFCOMMTERc, STAT. ABSTRAcroFr UNrrm STAins 462 (11 1th ed. 1991).
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year.82 Single men with children or other relatives lived on an average of
$7,049.83 Once again, these incomes included government transfers like AFDC
payments, unemployment compensation, and social security. For Americans
who end up in the bottom fifth of our income distribution-and one in five
households inevitably fall in that bottom fifth-it appears increasingly
impossible to support children above the poverty line.
Declining income for our poorest households may stem partly from
changes in family structure or low initiative.8 Increasingly, however,
economists identify low wages and high unemployment as root causes of this
decline. The minimum wage today, after controlling for inflation, is lower than
at any time in the 1950s, 1960s, or 1970s.8 5 The average weekly earnings of
white men with high school degrees has declined nine percent since 1969.86
Wages for women of color, men of color, and white women lag even further
behind.87 And earnings continue to decline relative to the rest of the economy.
During 1995, despite an expanding economy and skyrocketing stock prices,
worker earnings posted the smallest rise since the Labor Department began
keeping those statistics.88
At the bottom of our payscale, wages have simply become too low to
support families. Nor are jobs available for all of these adults. Unemployment
remains widespread, especially in the poorest urban centers and rural areas,
and especially among men and women of color. 89 One out of every eight black
Americans in the labor market is actively seeking work without success. 90 One
82 Blank, supra note 51, at 175. Once again, these households sometimes included
relatives other than children.83 Id.
84 See, e.g., WELtAM A. Kso, POVERTy AND mE UnM)cLass (1994).
85 Blank, supra note 51, at 194; see also MARIAN WRum~r EDELMAN, FAmms iN PERm
39 (1987) (showing continuous decline of full-time minimun wage earnings as a percent of the
poverty level for a fianily of three, from 103.6% of that poverty level in 1964 to 75% of the
poverty level in 1986).
86 Blank, supra note 51, at 172.
87 In 1989, men of color with high school degrees earned just seventy-eight cents for every
dollar paid a white man with the same education. Id. White women who were high school
graduates earned fifty-six cents on the dollar, while women of color earned sixty cents for every
dollar earned by a white man with the same high school education. Id.88 Robe D. Hershey Jr., Worker Earnings Post Rise of 2.7%, Lowest on Record, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 1, 1995, at Al; see also Census Data article, supra note 54 (according to census
data, average earnings of men employed full-time fell $300 between 1993 and 1994, after
adjusting for inflation).
89 For a discussion of the geographic concentration ofjoblessness, see Blank, supra note
51, at 171; WILAM J. WILsuN, supra note 32.
9 0 Blank, supranote 51, at 171.
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out of every ten Hispanic-Americans is in the same position. 91 And these
numbers omit pools of adult workers who have become so discouraged by
joblessness that they have ceased to seek employment and fallen from the
unemployment figures. 92
Teenaged childbearing has sheltered us from confronting these numbers.
As long as teenagers bear children and raise those children in poverty, we can
continue to believe that poverty stems from foolish personal choices. But
teenaged childbearing does not create poverty; low wages and unemployment
Cause poverty.93
If we move beyond our fixation on teenaged childbearing, and confront the
gross inequalities of our economic system, we face much harder questions. We
must ask whether we are willing to live in a society that deprives a significant
proportion of the adult population of the ability to raise children at a
subsistence level, while also tolerating extreme poverty for those children. In
the final section of this essay, I briefly consider this issue.
IV. PATHS FOR THE FUTURE: SHOULD WE ENABLE ALL AMERICANS TO
RAISE THEIR CHILDREN OUTSIDE POVERTY?
Some societies may be so poor that only a fraction of the adult population
can afford to reproduce and raise their children in comfort. The United States,
however, enjoys one of the highest levels of per capita income in the world.94
Under the United Nations' broader measure of "well-being," which includes
qualities such as life expectancy, adult literacy, and economic purchasing
power, our country ranks second in the world.95 Our society is wealthy enough
to afford all adults the chance to bear and raise children at least at the
91 Id. The rate is only half as high for white Americans. In 1992, 6.3% of adult white men
and 5.4% of adult white women were actively seeking work but unemployed. Id.92 james Tobin, Poverty in Relaton to Macroeconomic Trends, Cycles, and Policies, in
CONERON IG POVERTY PRESCRIP NS FOR CHANGE, supra note 51, at 147, 161.
93 E cmist James Tobin recently demonstrated that average weekly earnings and the
unemployment rate, when coupled with a third measure of the relationship between the poverty
level and the previous year's median income, explained a stunning seventy-nine percent of
yearly changes in poverty between 1968 and 1983. Id. at 156. Teenaged pregnancy may
contribute to low wages and unemrloyment-as young mothers are unable to take fully
productive positions in the labor market-but these calculations, like the figures recounted
above, suggest caution in attributing poverty to the rash decisions of impulsive teenagers.
94 UrnED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 14, at 856 (in 1993, the United
States ranked second highest-after Luxembourg-in per capita grss domestic product
calculated on a purchasing power parity basis).
95 Stamets, supra note 52. But see discussion supra note 52 (noting significant differences
between well-being of white and minority Americans).
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subsistence level marked by the poverty line. That ability-to choose
reproduction and provide minimal levels of food, shelter, and education to
one's children-is essential to human dignity. Maintaining a socioeconomic
system in which some individuals receive insufficient education for productive
employment, cannot find that employment, or earn wages too low to support
their children is intolerable. Doing so when other individuals reap large and
increasing proportions of the society's wealth is unconscionable. 96
If we commit to the principle that our society should give all adult couples
the power to raise one or two children at or above the poverty line,97 then we
must explore the means of equipping adults to meet that goal. Better education,
higher wages, stricter enforcement of anti-discrimination laws, increased
government subsidies, and more social services may all provide part of the
answer. Some remedies may pay for themselves by generating increased
productivity among the lowest paid adults. Inevitably, however, the answer
will require shifting some wealth from the top of our income scale to the
bottom. That process will reverse the recent, record-breaking concentration of
income and wealth in the top group.98
In this brief essay, I cannot address the best means of providing every adult
with the skills and opportunities to raise children unscarred by poverty.
Instead, I intend simply to frame the issue in these stark terms: We have
created a society in which a significant proportion of adults cannot afford to
9 6 See supra text accompanying notes 53-57 (discussing income and wealth shares of the
top American households).
97 In formulating this principle, I draw an arbitrary line defining the minimum number of
children that society should equip each adult to support. Even a wealthy society may not be able
to promise all adults unlimited fertility plus subsistence above the poverty line. The latter
promise, moreover, might raise serious equity questions between adults who prefer large
families and those who prefer small (or no) families. In making this preliminary argument,
intended to provoke finther thought about the economic supports necessary to facilitate
childrearing for all adults, I choose two children per couple as reflecting the current cultural
norm in the United States. According to the 1994 General Social Survey by the National
Opinion Research Center, 59% of American adults believe that two children are the "ideal
number of children for a family to have." General Social Survey, NATIONAL OPIN
RESEARCH CET, Nov. 1994, available in Westlaw, Poll Database. Only 1% favor no
children, 3% favor one child, 22% prefer three children, 12% prefer four children, and 1% favor
five or more. Id.
98 See supra text accompanying notes 53-57; see also Census Data article, supra note 54
(census data reveal "powerful long-term trends resulting in steadily widening income gaps
between both rich and poor and the wealthy and the middle class. The new census data show
that in 1994, these gaps were at the widest point recorded since the Census Bureau began
collecting these data in 196T'); id. (in 1994, the top 5% and top 20% of American households
both received recordlreaking shares of income).
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raise children in decent conditions. If that is not fair, and I do not believe it is
fair to either the adults or their children, then we must find ways to insure that
all adults are able to raise children without falling into poverty.
As we search for those methods, we must also confront the problem of
single parents. As the problem of teenaged childbearing reminds us, the status
of single parents is crucial to unraveling the web of poverty. In an ideal world,
two parents would raise each child. The partnership of two adults offers
economic and emotional supports that one parent may have difficulty providing
as effectively. 99 In our less-than-ideal world, however, we cannot ignore
widespread divorce, abandonment, spousal abuse, and child abuse. Nor can we
ignore the number of young men claimed by the criminal justice system. 10 To
guarantee support for all children in our real world, we must design an
economic and educational system that permits a single adult to work and
support two children above the poverty line.
The ramifications of that commitment are serious. In addition to enhancing
our educational system, providing more widespread employment, and raising
wages for the least skilled workers, we must raise the wages of women and
minorities (who often head single-parent households) compared to white men.
We will also need to provide systematic and subsidized childcare, and to
continue supporting the single parents of the youngest children. Until wage and
employment rates rise, we will need to provide more-not less-government
support to the poorest families.
These recommendations run directly counter to the current political
climate. We stand ready to cut taxes, dismantle government supports that
already leave one-fifth of our children impoverished, and throw between one
and two million more children into poverty.101 Yet the recommendations
99 A growing literature suggests that children from single-parent homes fare less well on a
variety of measures than do children from two-parent homes. See, e.g., KLSO, supra note 84, at
101-02 (summarizing studies). Explanations for this discrepancy include both heightened
parental conflict (preceding and following establishment of the one-parent home) and
diminished resources (both economic and emotional) in the one-parent home. See Paul R
Amato, Children's Adjustment to Divorce: Theories, Hypotheses, and Empirical Support, 55
. MARRIAm & FAMiLY 23 (1993) (summarizing research).
100 The problem is particularly acute among African-American men. One out of every
three black men between the ages of 20 and 29 currently is in jail, on parole, or on probation.
See, e.g., Holmstrom, supra note 52 (reporting the results of a study titled "Young Black
Americans and the Criminal-Justice System," produced by The Sentencing Project). About
seven percent of whites in their twenties are in a similar position. Id.
101A study by the Department of Health and Human Services estimated that the
"moderate" welfare reform bill approved by the Senate in 1995 would have pushed 1.1 million
additional children into poverty. The more conservative measures passed by the House of
Representatives would have shifted 2.1 million children into poverty. Allison Mitchell, 9hite
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sketched above follow inexorably from the principle that a just society should
permit all adults to bear children and raise them at least at the poverty line.
Other industrialized countries have made considerable strides towards
realizing that ideal. In the United States, 53% of families headed by single
mothers are poor-even after the government transfers that we attack as
lavish. 1°2 In the United Kingdom, only 18% of those families are poor; in
France, 16% are poor; in the Netherlands, 7%; and in Sweden, just 6%.103
The differences lie partly in better wage rates and private payment of child
support in those nations, partly in the greater availability of subsidized
childcare, and partly in larger government transfers.1°4 Through one or more
of these methods, each of these countries has made a commitment to an ideal
we have been unable to embrace: that every adult has the right to bear children
and raise those children at the society's subsistence level.
The fact that these countries peg that right to the economic resources of a
single adult, moreover, has not eliminated the tendency of parents to marry and
raise children as a couple. In the United States, without the supports I have
described, single mothers head 22% of all families with children.10 5 In the
United Kingdom, France, Sweden, and the Netherlands, the percentage is
roughly half as high; single mothers head only 12-13% of all families with
children.106 The incentives to bond together while raising children are
enormous: greater economic security, assistance with the demanding physical
and emotional aspects of raising children, and the purely adult rewards of
living as a couple. We need not fear that social supports for single parents
House Didn't Release Study on Senate Bill's Harm, N.Y. TIMES, Oct 28, 1995, atA8; see also
Census Data article, supra note 54 (noting that 1995 congressional proposals would cut $300
billion over seven years from basic benefit programs for low-income families, children, the
elderly, and the disabled; in contrast, the tax proposals moving through Congress would
disproportionately benefit the wealthiest 12% of households). President Clinton vetoed
Congress's compromise welfare bill in January of 1996, but the proposals remain the "focal
point of ongoing discussions about revamping the nation's welfare progrars." Jeffiey L. Katz,
Comparing Welfare Proposals, 54 CONG. Q. 559,559 (1996).
102 Irwin Garfinkel & Sara McLanahan, Single-Mother Families, Economic Insecuriy,
and Government Policy, in CONFRoNTNG PovERTY: PRESCPTNS FOR CHANGE, supra note
51, at 205, 209. For these calculations, the authors adopted a commonly accepted definition of
"poor" as living on income below one-half of the country's median income. Id. In the United
States, this measure corresponds closely with the official poverty level. See UNTIED STATES
DEP'TOFCOMMERCE, supra note 14, at 480 (ll5th ed. 1995) (poverty level for family of four
was $14,763 in 1993); i. at 469 (median income of U.S. households was $31,241 in 1993).
103 Garfinkel & McLanahan, supra note 102, at 209.
10 4 1d. at 209-10.
10 5 Id. at 209.106 Id
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make men superfluous; academic analyses confirm the commonsense notion
that most American women prefer to raise children in marriage.10 7
I have moved somewhat afield from the problem of teenaged childbearing.
Yet these conclusions follow naturally from a critical examination of the role
teen births play in perpetuating poverty. Teen childbearing is not the wellspring
of poverty; it is a symptom of poverty that contributes to the poverty cycle.
Careful analysis of teenaged childbearing reveals that other factors-
particularly declining wage rates, high unemployment, sharply increasing
economic inequalities, and the absence of social supports for single parents-
exert a much stronger influence on the well-being of our poorest citizens.
Addressing these problems, while also adopting programs to discourage teen
births, will lead us more surely to a bright future for all of our children.
In the end, we cannot separate economic and social reform from the
problem of teenaged births. The changes I have described will be our best
offense against teen births themselves. Empirical research is equivocal on
whether welfare payments really encourage childbearing. The effects are small,
if they exist at all. 1°8 The results are much more certain on the effects of
education, training, jobs, decent wages, and economic hope: those are
incentives that work. Teenagers who see an economic future for themselves are
less likely to risk that future through childbearing. By confronting the
economic ills in our society, we can address both teenaged childbearing and the
10 7 See Kost & Forrest supra note 12, at 16 (regression analyses reveal that marital status
exerts one of the strongest influences on whether a birth is wanted or unwanted; "most women
would prefer to have a birth within marriage" and "marital status ... is a crucial factor in
determining the timing ofa wanted birth.").
Some studies of the welfare system show that raising welfare payments modestly
decreases man'iage rates among young pregnant women. Lundberg & Plotnick, Economic
Incentives, supra note 24, at 188-89 (finding significant effect on marriage rates for white, but
not black, pregnant teenagers); Lundberg & Plotnick, Abortion and Family Planning, supra
note 24 (white teenagers); Schultz, supra note 31, at 63-64 (finding effect for both pregnant
black and pregnant white teenagers). But see An et al., supra note 30, at 202 (generosity of
welfare benefits had no statistically significant effect on out-of-wedlock teen births); Duncan &
Hoffman, supra note 31, at 529 (welfare benefit levels had no statistically significant effect on
out-of-wedlock births among black teenagers); Moore & Caldwell, supra note 23 (AFDC
benefits did not affect out-of-wedlock births among black or white teenagers). The women in
these populations, however, probably are at the highest risk of abandonment, divorce, and
abuse. The small number of unions discouraged by welfare payments in this population,
therefore, may be the very ones we should discourage as a society.
10 See, e.g., Duncan & Hoffman, supra note 31; Lundberg & Plotnick, Economic
Incentives, supra note 24 (welfare payments somewhat diminish the likelihood that teen
mothers will many, but show little effect on teen conception or births); Moore & Caldwell,
supra note 23.
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deeper problems of poverty.
V. CoNcLusION: WHAT'S LAW GOT TO Do WITH IT?
Teenaged childbearing is a personal, moral, social, medical, and economic
dilemma, but is it a legal one? Even poverty is more of a social and economic
crisis than a legal one. Why does this essay, as well as this symposium, appear
in a legal journal?
For better or worse, law informs every chapter of this tale. Laws govern
the teaching of sex education in schools, and forbid teachers to distribute
contraceptives. 10 9 Laws cut back funding for family planning services in poor
neighborhoods, restrict teenaged access to abortions, and deny public funding
to poor women who seek abortions.'10 Constitutional rules uphold those legal
practices by declining to recognize countervailing rights. 111 Statutes regulate
school financing, impairing opportunities for the poorest students, and
constitutional interpretations uphold those laws as well.112 Laws affect the
success of unions and contribute to declining wage rates. 113
The absence of adequate laws can be just as devastating. Laws fail to
address fully the persistent differences in wages paid men and women, or
whites and workers of color. 1 4 Laws fail to create adequate childcare systems
109 See, e.g., Koo et al., supra note 19, at 210 (South Carolina banned distribution of
contraceptives in school-based clinics, impairing program that had been successful in reducing
births among underprivileged rural teenagers); Firestone, supra note 18 (reviewing content of
sex education programs in state that was the second to mandate that instruction in schools).
110 See, e.g., Daniel Daley & Rachel B. Gold, Public Funding for Contraceptive,
Sterilization and Abortion Services, Fiscal Year 1992, 25 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 244 (1993);
Tery Solorn, State Actions on Reproductive Health Issues in 1994, 27 FAM. PLAN. PERsp. 83
(1995).
III See, e.g., HL. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (upholding parental notification
requirement for minors seeking abortions); Planned Parenthood v. Ashcrofl 462 U.S. 476
(1983) (upholding statute that required parental notification or judicial bypass for minors
seeking abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (upholding state decision to deny
Medicaid funding for elective abortions); Hams v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding
congressional restrictions on federal funding of abortions).112 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
113 See generally James J. Brudney, Reflections on Group Action and the Law of the
Workplace, 74 TEX. L. REv. (fthcoming May 1996).
114 Despite more than three decades of federal laws prohibiting wage discrimination,
wages for full-time white male workers continue to outpace wages for other full-time workers.
See, e.g., BARBARA REsKN & IRENE PADAViC, WOMEN AND MEN AT WoRK 104-05 (1994)
(full-tim black male workers earned less than three-quarters of the wages earned by full-time
white male workers; white women earned about 68% of the wages paid white men; and black
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and job training programs. Laws cut government supports for the poorest
women and children, while maintaining subsidies for private shipping fleets
and other corporate interests.115 Laws, as well as economic forces, determine
how we allocate wealth in society.
Beyond these shortcomings lies a more universal legal failure. Our system
is designed to recognize individual rights, and to provide remedies for
individual wrongs. Our legislatures are increasingly uncomfortable with class-
based remedies, and our courts hardly recognize them at all. Nor do we
acknowledge rights based on purely economic disadvantage, partly because
those are class-based claims resting on systemic failures. This is part of our
larger cultural quest to view poverty, like other hardships, as a product of
personal choice. The pervasive inability of our legal system to recognize social
deficiencies and group-based rights, however, perpetuates the cultural problem
and legitimizes it. We have not developed the legal tools even to ask whether
poverty could be the fault of social decisions, rather than private ones.
We persist in viewing poverty as an individual choice-or as punishment
for personal failings. Our emphasis on teenaged childbearing neatly fits that
paradigm. That is the tantalizing, but false, promise of teenaged births: the
hope that deterring these foolish "choices" will end both welfare and poverty
as we know them. We should do everything within our power to reduce
teenaged childbearing, so that both teenagers and their children have the best
opportunity to fulfill their dreams. But we will need to do so much more than
that if the most disadvantaged adults and children in our society are to share the
dreams that the rest of us take for granted.
women earned only 62% of the wages paid white men). Explanations for this persistent gap
vary, and are beyond the scope of this essay, but our legal system tolerates a situation in which
identifiable sex and race groups earn widely different wages.
115 Christopher Drew, Political Power Likely to Shield Ships' Subsidies, N.Y. TM,
Mar. 11, 1996, at Al (President Clinton and Republican leaders are both pushing a bill that
would give private shipping companies $1 billion in subsidies over 10 years); Karen Turnulty,
Why Subsidies Survive; Congress Has Surrendered in the War Against Corporate Welfare,
TME, Mar. 25, 1996, at 46 (some estimate that the federal government funnels up to $75 billion
per year-almost half the federal deficit-4o businesses).
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